What Is a Child? (And What Do They Deserve?)
Imagine you’re looking at a painting of a family from 700 years ago. The children in it don’t look like children you’d recognize. They’re dressed exactly like the adults. Their faces have the same expressions. They’re doing the same things. There’s no babyish roundness, no oversized clothes, no toys. The historian who first noticed this, Philippe Ariès, argued that medieval people simply thought of children as “little adults.” They didn’t think childhood was a special, separate stage of life the way we do.
That idea was controversial. Other historians found evidence that medieval people did have stages for childhood—they just didn’t paint them the way we do. But here’s what’s interesting: even if Ariès was wrong about the Middle Ages, he was right that our conception of childhood—the picture we have in our heads of what a child is—has changed over time. And that raises a strange philosophical question: What is a child, really? Are they just unfinished adults? Or is childhood something valuable in its own right?
The “Unfinished Adult” View
Most adults today, if you asked them, would probably say something like this:
A child is a young human who hasn’t fully developed yet. They’ll grow up to be an adult, with all the abilities adults have—reasoning, making decisions, taking responsibility. Childhood is the process of getting there.
This is actually a very old idea. Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, thought about living things in terms of what they become when they’re fully grown. An acorn’s whole point is to become an oak tree. A caterpillar’s whole point is to become a butterfly. And a child’s whole point is to become an adult. Aristotle called this the “final cause” of something—its purpose or end goal.
For a long time, this view seemed totally natural. Adults are the “finished product.” Children are the “work in progress.” And the main responsibility of parents and teachers is to help children become good adults—to give them the skills, knowledge, and character they’ll need later in life.
But philosophers and psychologists have started to notice problems with this picture.
The “Deficit View” Problem
One philosopher, Gareth Matthews, argued that seeing childhood through the lens of what children lack—adult reasoning, adult self-control, adult experience—means we miss what children have. Children, for example, are often better than adults at learning a second language. They’re often more creative in their art. They ask questions adults have stopped asking: “What makes something alive?” “Where do numbers come from?” “Why is there something instead of nothing?”
Matthews called this the “deficit conception” of childhood. It treats children as if they’re just defective adults, when in fact children have their own valuable ways of thinking and experiencing the world. As one psychologist put it: “Children aren’t just defective adults, primitive grownups gradually attaining our perfection and complexity. Instead, children and adults are different forms of homo sapiens. They have very different, though equally complex and powerful, minds, brains, and forms of consciousness.”
Here’s a concrete example. Developmental psychologist Jean Piaget famously said that young children are “animistic”—they think everything is alive. A child might say the sun is alive because it moves, or that a tree is alive because it grows. Piaget studied Swiss children in the 1920s and concluded that animism is a stage children pass through on their way to more sophisticated thinking.
But the anthropologist Margaret Mead studied children on the Pacific islands and found they weren’t animistic at all. So maybe the Swiss children weren’t going through a universal stage of development. Maybe they were just learning from the adults around them. And maybe what looked like a “mistake” (thinking the sun is alive) was actually a pretty smart thing for a child to think, given the information they had.
Piaget also described four stages in how children develop the concept of “life.” First, they think life = activity. Then, life = movement. Then, life = spontaneous movement. Finally, life = plants and animals. But this raises all kinds of questions that Piaget didn’t answer. What counts as “spontaneous” movement? Is a bear alive during hibernation? What about a Venus flytrap that snaps shut on a fly? These are real philosophical questions, and kids are asking them.
Can Children Make Their Own Choices?
There’s a big debate among philosophers about whether children can be “autonomous”—that is, capable of making genuine choices about their own lives.
The traditional view says: No, not really. Children under ten don’t have stable enough values. They don’t have enough experience. They can’t reflect critically on their choices. They’re too impulsive. So adults should make decisions for them.
But more recently, some philosophers have pushed back. They argue that autonomy doesn’t require full-blown adult reflection. It just requires being able to act in ways that reflect what you genuinely care about. A seven-year-old who loves drawing and chooses to spend her free time practicing, rather than watching TV, is acting autonomously. She’s governing herself in the service of something she values.
This gets complicated in real life. In some court cases, children have been allowed to speak for themselves about where they want to live after their parents divorce. In medical cases, children with terminal illnesses have sometimes been consulted about their treatment. The case of “Gregory K.” made headlines in the 1990s: at age twelve, he successfully argued in court to be “divorced” from his biological parents so he could be adopted by a new family.
But should children always get what they want? Most philosophers say no. Even if a child has some capacity for autonomy, adults still have a responsibility to protect them from bad decisions, especially when those decisions could have very negative long-term consequences. So the question becomes: When should adults step in, and when should they let children make their own choices?
Is Childhood Good or Bad?
This part gets complicated, but here’s what it’s about.
For a long time, philosophers assumed that childhood is valuable only because it leads to adulthood. Childhood was seen as a means to an end. But some philosophers now argue that childhood has what they call “intrinsic value”—that is, it’s valuable for its own sake, not just for what it produces.
Think about play. Yes, play helps children learn social skills and problem-solving. But is that the only reason it’s good? Or is play good because it’s fun and joyful and worth doing for its own sake? Most people, if they remember their own childhoods, will say play was good then, not just because it made them better adults later.
Other possible “goods of childhood” include: freedom from major responsibilities, lots of unstructured time, and certain kinds of innocence. These things might be harder to have as an adult.
But some philosophers have started asking the opposite question: Is childhood actually bad? Children are vulnerable in ways adults aren’t. They’re dependent on adults who might be neglectful or abusive. They have less control over their own lives. They can’t easily leave bad situations. So maybe some features of childhood are genuinely bad-making—not because adults are mean, but because of the nature of being a child.
This is still a live debate. Nobody really knows whether childhood, considered as a whole, is better or worse than adulthood. It probably depends heavily on the specific child and the specific adult.
Who Counts as Having “Moral Status”?
Here’s one more puzzle. Philosophers talk about “moral status”—meaning, who or what deserves moral consideration. Do you have to be a certain kind of being to count as someone we have direct moral duties toward?
Most people think adult humans clearly have moral status. You can’t just hurt them for no reason. But what about children?
Some philosophers, like Jan Narveson, have argued that only rational beings who can enter into reciprocal agreements with each other have moral status. Since young children can’t make agreements, they don’t have rights. (Most people find this view extreme and unpleasant.)
Others argue that children have moral status because of their potential to become rational adults. But this raises a hard question: What about children who will never reach adulthood—those with severe disabilities or terminal illnesses? Do they have moral status? And if so, on what grounds?
Some say: All humans have moral status, just because they’re human. Others say: Any being that can feel pleasure and pain has moral status. Still others say: Children have moral status because of the relationships they have with people who do have moral status—their parents love them, so we owe them respect too.
Here’s a more recent twist: Some philosophers argue that children have moral status because they can be active participants in caring relationships. A young child who comforts their sad parent isn’t just a passive receiver of care; they’re an active giver. That matters.
What’s Still Up for Debate
The philosophy of childhood is still full of open questions. Here are a few:
- If children can be autonomous in some areas of their lives, how do we decide which areas those are?
- Is childhood genuinely valuable in itself, or mainly valuable for what it leads to?
- If children have different strengths than adults (like language learning and creativity), should society change its expectations about what childhood is for?
- What do we owe to children who will never become “typical” adults?
These aren’t just academic questions. They affect how parents raise their children, how teachers teach their students, how courts decide custody cases, and how societies spend money on education and child welfare. The philosophy of childhood asks: What does it really mean to take children seriously?
Appendix 1: Key Terms
| Term | What it does in the debate |
|---|---|
| Deficit conception | The idea that childhood is understood mainly by what children lack compared to adults. Critics say this misses children’s real strengths. |
| Moral status | The question of whether children (and other beings) count, morally speaking—who deserves our direct ethical consideration. |
| Autonomy | The capacity to govern yourself in line with what you genuinely care about. Philosophers disagree about whether and when children have it. |
| Intrinsic value | Something is valuable for its own sake, not just as a means to something else. Some philosophers say childhood has this. |
| Final cause | Aristotle’s term for the purpose or end goal of something. If a child’s final cause is to become an adult, childhood is just a stage on the way. |
Appendix 2: Key People
- Aristotle — Ancient Greek philosopher who thought about everything in terms of what it becomes when fully grown. His view of children as “unfinished adults” is still influential today.
- Philippe Ariès — Historian who argued that medieval people thought of children as “little adults.” His work kicked off the modern debate about whether childhood is a natural or a social idea.
- Jean Piaget — Famous developmental psychologist who studied how children’s thinking changes as they grow up. He thought children go through universal stages of cognitive development.
- Gareth Matthews — Philosopher who argued that seeing children as “deficit adults” misses their real strengths, like creativity and philosophical questioning.
- Carol Gilligan — Psychologist who criticized Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development for being too focused on rules and justice, and for ignoring the “care” orientation she found more common in girls and women.
- Jan Narveson — Philosopher who took the extreme view that only rational beings who can make agreements have moral status, leaving children without rights. Most philosophers disagree with him.
Appendix 3: Things to Think About
-
If children are better than adults at some things (like learning languages, asking big questions, or creating art), does that change what we owe them? Should schools be different if childhood isn’t just a waiting room for adulthood?
-
A five-year-old says she doesn’t want to visit her father anymore after her parents divorce. Should a judge take her seriously? What if she’s saying it because she’s angry, not because she’s thought it through? How do you tell the difference?
-
Some philosophers say childhood is bad because children are vulnerable, dependent, and have less control over their lives. Others say childhood is good because of play, freedom, and innocence. Can both be true? How would you decide which side is right?
-
Think about a time you made a decision that adults didn’t agree with. Were you being autonomous, or were you just being impulsive? What would count as evidence one way or the other?
Appendix 4: Where This Shows Up
- Education debates: The “unfinished adult” view influences how schools are designed. If you change the view, you might change the school.
- Child custody cases: Courts increasingly consider children’s preferences, not just what adults think is best. This is a direct application of debates about children’s autonomy.
- Medical ethics: Doctors and parents sometimes disagree about whether children should be told the truth about terminal illnesses, or whether they can consent to treatment.
- Debates about play: Arguments over whether recess and unstructured play time matter “just for fun” or only because they help kids learn—this is the intrinsic vs. instrumental value debate in action.